We prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a Bayesian game with infinitely many players. We make three main advances to the existing literature. In particular:
INTRODUCTION
Many aspects of Bayesian games (or games with differential information) have been studied in the literature. The question regarding the existence of equilibria in these games is one of them. Milgrom and Weber [16] noted that the usual fixed point argument of Nash [17] with the standard assumptions is not applicable in proving the existence of Bayesian equilibrium and hence introduced sufficient conditions for the existence. Balder [1, 2] generalized their result and Radner and Rosenthal [21] presented sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. However, all these existence results are limited to a finite number of agents (or players). Hence, it is of interest to know not only the conditions which guarantee existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) with infinitely many players, but also how one defines the notion of a BNE in the presence of a continuum of players. To the best of our knowledge this has not been done. The main purpose of this paper is to provide equilibrium existence results for Bayesian games with infinitely many agents.
While equilibrium existence results in Bayesian games have been confined to the finite number of agents, the literature of games or economies without differential information has studied models with infinitely many agents. In this literature, two main different approaches have been employed to model infinitely many agents. One is to extend the finite agent's model directly to the infinite case so that the joint strategy profile of all agents is just the product of each agent's strategy (e.g., Yannelis and Prabhakar [26] among others). We call this the Cartesian Product Approach. In this approach, even if there are infinitely many agents, a priori each agent's action can unilaterally affect the outcome of the game. The other approach is to impose a measure space structure on the set of agents so that each agent's action is negligible but the joint action by the agents with positive measure can affect the outcome of the game (e.g., Khan [15] an Schmeidler [23] among others). We call this the Measure Theoretic Approach. In this paper we will examine both settings in the context of Bayesian games and provide Bayesian equilibrium existence theorems for each one separately.
In modeling differential information in Bayesian games, we use the information partition approach following the models of Postlewaite and Schmeidler [20] , Palfrey and Srivastava [18] . In this approach all uncertainty arises from an exogenously given probability measure space denoting the states of the nature of the world and each agent's private information is a partition of the state space. Therefore, under this approach each agent's strategy is a function from the state space to hisÂher set of available actions, which is measurable with respect to hisÂher information partition. Thus, one could interpret a strategy as a behavioral strategy. This is in contrast with the Bayesian equilibrium existence results of Milgrom and Weber [16] and Balder [1, 2] which are based on the Harsanyi type model and proved the existence of an equilibrium in distributional strategies for Bayesian games with a finite number of agents.
There are two other works in the literature which prove Bayesian equilibrium existence with infinitely many agents. First, Balder and Rustichini [3] proved the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium in distributional strategies with infinitely many players. They used the Cartesian product approach and imposed a continuity assumption which amounts to the fact that only a countable number of agents can affect the payoff of each agent even though there are uncountably many. They also assumed the independent types condition which means that each agent's type is drawn independently from the others. Balder and Yannelis [4] showed the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium with a measure space of agents but they considered only the case of symmetric information.
The purpose of this paper is to make three main new advances in the existing literature. First, we provide existence results for Bayesian games with infinitely many agents covering the Cartesian product approach as well as the Measure theoretic approach. Second, we used the information partition approach to model the differential information rather than the type set approach and therefore, our equilibrium is in behavioral strategies rather than in distributional strategies. It should be noted that by using this approach, we are able to eliminate the independent type assumption used in Balder and Rustichini [3] . Third, our results allow the individual's action set to depend on the state of nature and to be an arbitrary subset of a separable Banach space. In order to obtain existence results which allow us to incorporate all the above generalization, a new proof of a novel type is required.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains the notation and the basic definitions. In Section 3, we introduce the game with differential information as well as the notion of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 contain our main existence theorems, and Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and open questions. Finally, we have collected the main technical lemmas for our existence theorems in the Appendices.
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
We begin with some notation and definitions. Let 2 X denote the set of all nonempty subsets of the set X. If X and Y are sets, the graph of the set-valued function (or correspondence) , :
Let (0,
where B(Y ) denotes the Borel _-algebra on Y and denotes the product _-algebra. The measurable function f: 0 Ä Y is called a measurable selection
Let (0, F, +) be a finite measure space and Y be a Banach space. Following Diestel-Uhl [9] , the function f : 0 Ä Y is called simple if there exist y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n in Y and E 1 , E 2 , ..., E n in F such that
for +-a.e.
An F-measurable function f : 0 Ä Y is said to be Bochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple functions [ f n : n=1, 2, .
..] such that
In this case, for each E # F we define the integral of f, denoted by
It can be shown (see Diestel 
It turns out to be important in our paper that the Dominated Convergence Theorem holds for Bochner integrable functions. In particular, if f n : 0 Ä Y(n=1, 2, ...) is a sequence of bochner integrable functions such that for +-a.e.
where g : 0 Ä R is an integrable function, then f is Bochner integrable and
The space of equivalence classes of Y-valued Bochner integrable functions y: 0 Ä Y, normed by 
It is a standard result (Diestel and Uhl [9] ) that if Y* (the norm dual for of Y ) has the RNP with respect to (T,
If [F n : n=1, 2, ...] is a sequence of nonempty subsets of a Banach space Y, we denote by Ls F n and Li F n the set of its limit superior and limit inferior points respectively, i.e.,
A | in front of Ls F n (Li F n ) will mean limit superior (inferior) with respect to the weak topology _(Y, Y*). If Z is a metric space, Y is a Banach space and ,: Z Ä 2 Y is a correspondence, we say that , is upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) if Ls ,(z n )/,(z) whenever the sequence z n # Z converges to z (written as z n Ä z).
THE GAME WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION
Let (0, F, +) be a complete, finite, separable measure space, where 0 denotes the set of states of the world and the _-algebra F, denotes the set of events. Let Y be a separable Banach space and T be a set of agents (either finite or infinite).
A Bayesian game (or a game with differential information) is G=[(X t , u t , F t , q t ) : t # T], where
Y is the action set-valued function of agent t, where X t (|) is the set of actions available to t when the state is |, (2) for each | # 0, u t (|, } ): > s # T X s (|) Ä R is the utility function of agent t, which can depend on the states, (3) F t is a sub _-algebra of F which denotes the private information of agent t, (4) q t : 0 Ä R ++ is the prior of agent t, (where q t is a Radon Nikodym derivative such that q t (w) d+(|)=1).
Let L X t denote the set of all Bochner integrable and F t -measurable selections from the action set-valued function X t : 0 Ä 2 Y of agent t, i.e.,
The typical element of L X t is denoted as x~t while that of X t (|), as
Throughout the paper, we assume that for each t # T, there exists a finite or countable partition 6 t of 0. Moreover, the _-algebra F t is generated by 6 t . For each | # 0, let E t (|) (=6 t ) denote the smallest set in F t containing | and we assume that for all t,
For each | # 0, the conditional (interim) expected utility function of agent t, " t (|, } , } ): L X t _X t (|) Ä R is defined as:
The function " t (|, x~& t , x t ) is interpreted as the conditional expected utility of agent t using the action x t when the state is | and the other agents employ the strategy profile x~& t , where x~& t is an element of L X &t . A Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G is a strategy profile x~* # L X such that for all t # T " t (|, x~* &t , x~t *(|))= max
We can now state the assumptions needed for our first main theorem.
Y is a nonempty, convex, weakly compact valued and integrably bounded correspondence having a F t -measurable graph, i.e.,
is endowed with the weak topology and X t (|), with the norm topology.
(iv) u t is integrably bounded.
Remark. Since the norm topology is finer than the weak topology, (A.2) (i) is weaker than the weak continuity of u t (|, } , } ) in actions of all agents.
COUNTABLY MANY AGENTS
We can now state our first main result.
Theorem 4.1. Let T be a countable set. Let G=[(X t , u t , F t , q t ) : t # T] be a Bayesian game satisfying (A.1) (A.2). Then there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G.
Proof. It follows from Lemma A.1 in Appendix I that for each
is endowed with the weak topology and X t (|), with the norm topology. It is easy to see that for each (
A direct application of Weierstrass theorem implies that for each (|, x~& t ) # 0_L X &t , , t (|, x~& t ) is nonempty. By the Berge maximum theorem for each
is endowed with the norm topology and L X &t , with the weak topology. Moreover, it follows from the concavity of " t in x t that for each
By Lemma A.2 in Appendix I, for each x~& t # L X &t , . t ( }, x~& t ) has a F tmeasurable graph. Therefore, by the Aumann measurable selection theorem for each fixed x~& t # L X &t , there exists an 
Since L X s is weakly compact for all s, so is L X . Since X t : 0 Ä 2 Y has a measurable graph and it is integrably bounded, L X t is nonempty by the Aumann measurable selection theorem. It follows from the convex valuedness of X t that L X t is convex. Since 8 t is weakly u.s.c., so is 8. It is easy to see that 8 is convex, nonempty valued. Therefore, by the Fan Glicksberg fixed point theorem there exists x~* # L X such that x~* # 8(x~*). The reader can easily verify that x~* is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G by construction. This completes the proof of the theorem. K
EXISTENCE RESULT: UNCOUNTABLY MANY AGENTS
In this section, we present Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence theorems with uncountably many agents. There are two different ways of modeling games with uncountably many agents. One is to model games without any measure structure on the set of agents T. In this case, the joint strategy of all agents is simply an element in the Cartesian product of each agent's strategy set L X t . The other is to model games with a measure structure on the set of agents T. In this approach, naturally each individual agent's action can be negligible but the aggregate action can matter. Each model has its own merits depending on the situation. In this section, we provide Bayesian equilibrium existence theorems for both settings. We first begin with Bayesian games without a measure structure on T, which we call the Cartesian Product Approach.
The Cartesian Product Approach
In this model, all the aspects of the Bayesian game G is the same as the model with the countably many agents except that T is now uncountable. Unfortunately, the proof given in the previous section does not hold since if T is uncountable, L X &t is not metrizable, which means that we can no longer use Lemma A.5 in Appendix I. However, in our proposition below the continuity assumption on the utility function implies that for each agent t, there exists a countable set J t ( /T) such that the actions of agents in T&J t do not affect the utility of agent t. In a different setting, a similar property of the continuous utility function was called Countable Myopia by Balder and Rustichini [3] .
is the class of continuous functions on L X ), then there exists a countable subset J of T such that for every x~, y~# L X , if x~t= y~t for t # J, then f (x~)= f ( y~).
Proof. Note that L X ( #> t # T L X t ) is endowed with the product topology of the weak topology in each L X t . Then L X t is weakly compact by Lemma A.4 in Appendix I. Since L X t is a separable Banach space, the
Then A is an algebra which contains the constant function 1 and separates points of L X (i.e., for x~, y~# L X with x~{ y~, there exists g # A such that g(x~){ g( y~)). Therefore, by the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, A is dense in C(L X ) by the sup. norm.
Since f n # A, f n (x~)=> s # J n f s (x~s) for some finite index set J n . Moreover, we can have J n /J n+1 . Let J= n=1 J n . Then, if x~t= y~t for t # J,
Now, we are ready to state our second main existence theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let T be an uncountable set. Let G=[(X t , u t , F t , q t ): t # T] be a Bayesian game satisfying (A.1) (A.2). Then, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G.
Proof. By Lemma A.1 in Appendix I, for each | # 0, " t (|, } , } ): L X &t _X t (|) Ä R is continuous. By the above Proposition, there exists a countable set J | t (/T) such that
Notice that if | and |$ are in the same partition,
So, we can assume that J 
As it was shown in Theorem 4.1, it is easy to show that , t is nonempty, convex valued and , t is weakly u.s.c. in x~J
Since > s # J t L X s is metrizable, 8 t is weakly u.s.c. (recall Lemma A.5 in Appendix I) and nonempty, convex valued.
Then again 8 is weakly u.s.c. and nonempty, convex valued. Since L X is weakly compact, convex set, by the Fan Glicksberg fixed point theorem there exists x~* # L X such that x~* # 8(x~*). It can be easily checked that x~* is a Bayesian equilibrium for G. K
Measure Space of Agents
In this section, we study the Bayesian game G with a measure space of agents. A Bayesian game with a measure space of agents (T, T, &) is G= [(X, u, F t , q t ) : t # T)], where
Y is the action set-valued function, where X(t, |) is interpreted as the set of actions available to agent t when the state is |, (2) for each (t, |) # T_0, u(t, |, } , }): L 1 (&, y)_X(t, |) Ä R is the utility function, where u(t, |, x, x t ) is interpreted as the utility of agent t using action x t when the state is | and other players use the joint action x, (3) F t is the sub _-algebra of F which denotes the private information of agent t, (4) q t : 0 Ä R ++ is the prior of agent t.
As before, let L X t denote the set of all Bochner integrable, F t -measurable selections from the action set-valued function X(t) of agent t, i.e.,
In a Bayesian game with a measure space of agents, a strategy for agent t is an element in L X t and a joint strategy profile is an element in L X . For each (t, |) # T_0, the conditional expected utility function of agent t, &(t, |, } , } ): L X _X(t, |) ÄR is defined as
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G is a strategy profile x~* # L X such that for &-a.e. and for +-a.e., &(t, |, x~*, x~*(t, |))= max
&(t, |, x~*, y).
We can now state the assumptions needed for the proof of the next theorem.
Y is a nonempty, convex, weakly compact valued and integrably bounded correspondence having a T F-measurable graph, i.e., G X # T F B(Y ).
(ii) For each t # T, X(t, } ): 0 Ä 2 Y has a F t -measurable graph, i.e., G X(t) # F t B(Y ).
is endowed with the weak topology and X(t, |) with the norm topology.
(iv) u t is integrably bounded. 
Since for each x~# L X , 8( }, x~) has a T-measurable graph, 9(x~) is a nonempty set (recall the Aumann measurable selection theorem). Another application of Lemma A.5 in Appendix I enables us to conclude that is weakly u.s.c. It is easy to see that is convex valued and that the set L X is nonempty, convex and weakly compact. Therefore, by the Fan Glicksberg fixed point theorem there exists x~* # L X such that x~* # 9(x~*). Then by the construction of 9, x~* is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G. This completes the proof. K
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Remark 6.1. In the Cartesian product approach, the continuity assumption dictates that for each agent t, there is only a countable number of agents whose action can affect the agent t's utility. Hence the remaining uncountably many agents' actions are meaningless in this infinite game. It is always a countable few who affect the agent t 's utility even though this countable set can change depending on the functional form of the utility. Even a single agent's action can affect the agent t 's utility if that agent is in the important countable set. We don't know if one can dispense with this assumption, this is an open question.
Remark 6.2. In the measure theoretic approach, actions of a countable number of agents are meaningless unless they are atoms in the measure space. An individual agent's action is negligible but the joint actions of set of agents with positive measure matter. Hence, the measure theoretic approach is more appropriate if one wants to analyze the models of perfect competition.
Remark 6.3. Note that assumptions (B.1), (B.2) in Section 5.2 are the same as (A.1), (A.2) and that (B.4) is the measurability assumption (needed since we introduce a measure structure on the set of agents, T ). The only new assumption is (B.3), which we need to prove the weak continuity of the expected utility function in Lemma 4.6 in Appendix II. If 0 is uncountable and each agent's information partition is uncountable, then to prove the weak continuity of expected utility we need another assumption:
Assumption (B.3)$ is rather strong but it is necessary to prove the weak continuity if 0 is uncountable (see, for example, Balder Yannelis [4] ).
Remark 6.4. Assumption (B.3) can also be replaced by the fact that each partition is countable and the proof of Theorem 5.3 will still go through.
Remark 6.5. One may wonder as to whether or not the``information partition'' approach adopted in this paper is superior to the``Harsanyi type'' approach. It is difficult to answer this question because we are not aware of any existence results for the latter approach with the continuum of players. However, for the finite or countable set of players model, all we can say is that our assumptions seem to be less restrictive. However, this doesn't mean that one cannot eventually obtain more general existence results for the``Harsanyi-type'' model. It is important to note that one may be able to show that we can go back and forth from the one approach to the other. However, at the moment in a general setting this seems to be an open question. As far as the applicability of our model is concerned we feel that the``information partition'' approach is closer to the one adopted in the implementation literature as well as in the growing literature on economies with differential information.
Remark 6.6. Throughout the paper we employ the concept of Bochner integration. This notion may be a restriction in some cases because it becomes difficult to work with spaces which are not separable. Indeed, one may adopt the notion of Gelfand integral (or Pettis) in order to remedy this difficulty. However, at the moment the corresponding results on Bochner integration, e.g., Fatou's Lemma, integration preserves u.s.c., etc. (see, for example, Yannelis [25] ) are not available for the Gelfand or Pettis integrals. Once such results are available, one may be able to obtain equilibrium existence theorems for non-separable spaces. At the moment this is an open question.
Remark 6.7. For the deterministic model with a continuum of players, equilibrium existence results in pure strategies are available and by now we know that the non-atomicity of the measure space of players makes the Lyapunov theorem applicable. However, in the present framework Lyapunov's theorem fails (due to the infinite dimensionality of the strategy space) and approximate or even exact versions under certain conditions may be needed in order to obtain purification results. The work of Podczeck [19] and Rustichini Yannelis [22] may be useful in order to obtain pure strategy equilibrium results.
APPENDIX I
We begin the Appendix by proving the weak continuity of the conditional expected utility function of each agent.
Lemma A.1. Let u t : > s{t X s _X t Ä R be continuous when X s (s{t) is endowed with the weak topology and X t , with the norm topology. Then for
is continuous where L X s (s{t) is endowed with the weak topology and X t , with the norm topology.
Proof. Let x~n &t , x~& t # > s{t L X s and x n t , x t # X t satisfying x~n &t Ä x~& t and x n t Ä x t . By the property of the product topology, for each s({t), x~n s Ä x~s weakly (written as x~n s Ä | x~s). We need to show that
We prove this via two steps. First, we show: 
and x~n s # L 1 (+, Y).
Since x~n s converges to x~s weakly in L 1 (+, Y ), (2) converges to
Since the choice of y* # Y* is arbitrary, x~n s (|) converges weakly to x~s(|). This proves Claim 1.
. Proof of Claim 2. By Claim 1, for each s( {t), for each | # 0, x~n s (|) converges weakly to x~s(|). By the continuity of u t with the given topologies, for each | # 0, u t (x~n &t (|), x n t ) converges to u t (x~& t (|), x t ). Therefore, by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem
which completes the proof. The lemma below is known as Diestel's theorem and several alternative proofs can be found in the literature. For completeness, we provide a proof (see also Yannelis [25, p. 7] and the references therein).
Lemma A.4. Let Y be a separable Banach space and X t : 0 Ä 2 Y be integrably bounded, weakly compact, convex valued correspondence. Then the set
is weakly compact in L 1 (+, Y).
Proof. The proof is based on the celebrated theorem of James [14] . Note that the dual of L 1 (+, Y ) is L (+, Y* w* ) where w* denotes the w*-topology), i.e., L 1 (+, Y )*=L (+, Y* w* ) (see, for instance, Tulcea Tulcea [24] ). Let x be an arbitrary element of L (+, Y* w* ). If we show that x attains its supremum on L X t , the result will follow from James' theorem (James [14] ). Note that
where the second equality follows from Theorem 2.2 of Hiai Umegaki [13] . Define
It follows from the weak compactness of X t (|) that for all | # 0, g t (|) is nonempty. Define f t : 0_Y Ä R by
It is easy to see that for each |, f t (|, } ) is continuous and for each y, f t ( }, y) is F t -measurable and hence f t ( } , } ) is jointly measurable. Then observe that G g t = f &1 t (0) & G X t and that since f &1 t (0) and G X t belong to F t B(Y ), so does G g t . It follows from the Aumann measurable selection theorem that there exists an F t -measurable function z t : 0 Ä Y such that z t (|) # g t (|) +-a.e. | Thus, z t # L X t and we have
Since x # L (+, Y* w* ) was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that every element of (L 1 (+, Y ))* attains its supremum on L X t and this completes the proof of the fact that L X t is weakly compact. The result below is taken from Yannelis [25, p. 19] and it is reported for the share of completeness.
Lemma A.5. Let (0, F, +) be a complete, finite, separable measure space, Z be a metric space and Y be a separable Banach space. Let ,: 0_Z Ä 2 Y be a nonempty, convex valued correspondence satisfying
Y is weakly u.s.c., i.e., is continuous when Z is endowed with the metric topology and Y, with the weak topology.
(ii) for all (|, z) # 0_Z, ,(|, z)/X(|), where X: 0 Ä 2 Y is an integrably bounded, convex, weakly compact and nonempty valued correspondence.
is weakly u.s.c.
Proof. First, note that L 1 (+, X ) defined by
is weakly compact in L 1 (+, Y ) (recall Lemma A.4). By Lemma A.4, for each z # Z, the set 
Since for each | # 0, ,(|, } ) has a weakly closed graph, we have that w&L s [,(|, z n )]/,(|, z).
Since ,(|, z) is convex and weakly compact, we can conclude from (3) and (4) that x~(|) # ,(|, z) +-a.e. Since , is integrably bounded, it follows that x~# 8(z). This completes the proof of the Lemma. K
APPENDIX II
In this Appendix we prove the continuity of the expected utility for the case of a measure space of players. Proof. Let x~n, x~# L 1 (&, L 1 (+, X )) and x n t , x t # Y such that x~n converges weakly to x~and x~n t converges (in norm) to x t . We need to show that | | # E u(t, x~n(|), x n t ) d+(|) Ä | | # E u(t, x~(|), x t ) d+(|).
We prove this via two steps. First, we show 
